
Subjectivity, otherness and intercultural ethos in Colombian education
105 Alexander Benavides-Franco
Revista Unimar Julio-Diciembre 2024
e-ISSN: 2216-0116 ISSN: 0120-4327 DOI: https://doi.org/10.31948/rev.unimar
Rev. Unimar Vol. 42 No. 2 pp. 98-111
imposed order. It is included, ultimately, to
deny dierence and otherness and to congure
sociality according to the logic of totality.
Thus, according to Fornet-Betancourt (2004),
there are currently inclusive societies, but
they are systematically and structurally
discriminatory; it is not simply a matter of
including, for example, indigenous peoples and
their traditional knowledge in a dominant order,
but of restructuring the rights of all within that
order. For him, the intercultural strategy, in
order not to become ‘inclusivist’ in this sense,
must open up the framework of rights; that is,
it is a matter of decentering and restructuring
those rights, rather than including others within
the existing law.
An example of this inclusion in current law,
according to the author, is the concept of
citizenship, which often becomes an instrument
of exclusion in the legal framework. In fact, he
states that «in the nation-states, the concept of
citizenship is used as an instrument of exclusion;
it is rather a means of institutionalizing
exclusion» (Fornet-Betancourt, 2004, p. 48).
In other words, the strategy of incorporation
and inclusion that operates in the concept of
citizenship is nothing more than the subtle
imposition of a hegemonic project that ends
up denying otherness. It could be said that
the acquisition of citizenship becomes a lter
through which only people whose prole ts the
requirements of the Enlightenment project can
pass: male, white, Catholic, property-owning,
educated, and heterosexual. Therefore, those
individuals who do not t this prole, that is,
what Ricardo Salas (2006) calls ‘emerging
subjectivities’ -women, blacks, indigenous
people, illiterates, homosexuals, etc.- would
remain in the sphere of illegality, under the
surveillance and punishment of the law that
excludes them.
As Castro-Gómez (2000) points out, pedagogy
would be responsible for materializing this
desirable type of modern subjectivity, and thus
the school became the place where the type
of subject required by the regulatory ideals of
the constitutions was formed. It was there that
children were to acquire the knowledge, skills,
values, and cultural models that would enable
them to play a productive role in society. In
this way, the school taught how to be a ‘good
citizen’, but not how to be a good peasant, a
good native, or a good black, since all of these
human types were considered part of the sphere
of barbarism.
Fornet-Betancourt (2004) criticizes education
as an instrument of the nation-state because
it is incapable of dealing with Latin America’s
diversity; he considers it important to «hold
ourselves accountable for the damage caused
by the nation-state, with its homogeneous way
of educating for a uniform life that ignores
the diversity of historical memories of this
continent» (p. 50). In fact, the educational
system not only coordinates knowledge, but also
acts as a lter and a mechanism of exclusion of
other knowledge. In this way, «the educational
system is in reality the knowledge apparatus
through and by which the members of the elite
of a given cultural, political, etc., community tell
the members of that society what they should
learn» (pp. 21-22).
It could be said that the process of inventing
citizenship and the process of inventing the
other are genetically related, in that the creation
of the identity of the modern Latin American
citizen implies the creation of a counterpart
from which this identity could be armed.
Thus, paradoxically, the creation of the Latin
American citizen implies a process of exclusion
and denial of dierence and otherness, resulting
in what we could call the impossibility of
community. That is, by denying, in the name of
an ideal or imagined community, the plurality of
expressions that would make possible a ‘factual’
community, that is, a community that does not
deny conict as something inherent to itself, the
very possibility of community is denied. In this
sense, Fornet-Betancourt (2004) invites us to
consider, from an intercultural perspective, that
dissent is at the heart of the social biography of
a culture:
[It is important] to suspect that the image
that a culture currently presents to us is an
image that is supported by the consensus of
the totality of its members. We can and should
assume that there has always been someone